ANALISI COSTI-BENEFICI E VALUTAZIONE DEGLI INVESTIMENTI NELLE INFRASTRUTTURE DI TRASPORTO

Gruppo di Lavoro sulla valutazione dei progetti, Analisi costi-benefici del nuovo collegamento ferroviario Torino - Lione. Roma, 11 febbraio 2019, 79 p. [formato PDF, 1,8 MB].

Avv. Pucciariello, Relazione tecnico-giuridica (sulla nuova linea ferroviaria Alta Velocità/Alta Capacità Torino-Lione). Roma, 11 febbraio 2019, 53 p. [formato PDF, 1,2 MB].

Alessio Marabucci (Università Roma Tre), Le Analisi Costi Benefici applicate alle infrastrutture di trasporto: il problema della sovrastima dei benefici. Rivista di Economia e Politica dei Trasporti, n. 2, art. 1 (2017), 24 p. [formato PDF, 755 kB]. "E' noto che la metodologia dell'Analisi Costi Benefici (ACB) riveste un ruolo fondamentale per la valutazione dei progetti di investimento, e tale ruolo nel tempo è diventato sempre più rilevante. La normativa recente, primo tra tutti il DPCM 3 agosto 2012, ha introdotto una riforma fondamentale per utilizzare al meglio le risorse pubbliche, per cui solo i progetti attentamente valutati mediante l'ACB e che dimostrino la loro convenienza per la collettività e la loro sostenibilità sociale ed ambientale, potranno essere finanziati con le risorse statali. Anche il D.lgs 50/2016, il Nuovo codice degli appalti, ha introdotto importanti novità, in quanto tale documento pone l'ACB come la base del Documento di programmazione del Ministero Infrastrutture e Trasporti (MIT). In questo contesto appare ancora più importante l'attenzione che deve essere posta nella valutazione dei costi, ma soprattutto dei benefici connessi ad un investimento; in particolare nel caso della valutazione di nuove linee metropolitane si rischia di sovrastimare i benefici, soprattutto quelli legati ai risparmi dei tempi e dei km di percorrenza sui mezzi privati a seguito della diversione modale dopo l'apertura al pubblico della nuova infrastruttura. Spesso però i risultati dei modelli di simulazione trasportistica tesi a valutare l'effetto sull'utenza di una nuova infrastruttura di trasporto sovrastimano questi effetti, come probabilmente si è verificato nel caso delle valutazioni dei progetti riguardanti la linea C, la linea B1 e la linea D della metropolitana di Roma. Questo lavoro intende proporre alcuni accorgimenti che potrebbero aiutare l'analista impegnato in queste valutazioni, al fine di evitare di attribuire un beneficio eccessivo a queste opere e ridimensionarne l'impatto sulla congestione stradale."

Paolo Beria, Raffaele Grimaldi (Politecnico di Milano), An ex-post cost benefit analysis of Italian High Speed train, five years after. (Working papers SIET 2016), SIET, 2016, 19 p. [formato PDF, 735 kB]. "The core of Italian HS rail plan is the Turin-Salerno line, in operation since 2009. The central segment Milan - Rome has been working well since the opening, with good demand figures quite in line with the later forecasts. The extremes of the line, namely the extensions to Turin and to Naples/Salerno has remained for long far less used. In 2012, unique case in Europe, a newcomer entered in the market and pushed a radical change in Trenitalia marketing, quality and pricing. This positive fact has fostered the market, with supply and demand dramatically increased, reduced fares and distributed benefits to the users, also in terms of new mobility practices. The paper aims at revising a former Cost Benefit Analysis exercise, produced just two years after line opening, in the light of the changed conditions. In particular, applying a similar methodology and estimating on the basis of third-party sources the current Origin-Destination demand matrix, we will recalculate the economic feasibility indicators. The cost-benefit analysis gives a marginally positive result in the most-likely case. To the contrary, extrapolating pre-competition trends without competition, gives a very negative result. In fact, we show that travel time benefits are a fraction of the cost. The largest benefits comes from the new demand, which in turn comes from increased frequency, from the introduction of mixed traditional/high-speed services and from the fall in prices due to the entrance of NTV."

Daniel Veryard (International Transport Forum), Quantifying the Socio-Economic Benefits of Transport: Roundtable Summary and Conclusions. (Discussion Paper 2016-06). OECD/ITF, Paris, April 2016, 32 p. [formato PDF, 1,4 MB]. "Socio-economic cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is a powerful framework that can be very useful to governments making investment decisions. However the standard application of transport CBA has room for improvement. This paper describes efforts to improve the quality of transport CBA and its applicability to decision making. Three areas are addressed in detail: strategies for making the most of CBA, valuing and forecasting reliability benefits, and capturing wider economic impacts. The report is based on the papers and discussions at a Roundtable meeting of 30 experts held in Paris in November 2015. Roundtable participants took the view that a multi-faceted approach is needed to address the shortfalls; CBA theory and practice need to be gradually expanded to incorporate more impacts in the rigorous valuation and forecasting framework; and CBA results need to be more effectively linked to other criteria in the broader decision-making framework, including by bringing in a more diverse evidence base."

Rémy Prud'homme, Essai d'analyse coûts-benefices de la ligne ferroviaire Lyon-Turin. Mai 2014, 14 p. [formato PDF, 120 kB]. "Ce papier reprend un travail de 2007 sur le même sujet, avec des données nouvelles (sur le coût ou le trafic) et parfois des méthodologies nouvelles (sur le surplus des utilisateurs), mais avec des conclusion inchangées: cette ligne est une folie".

Ofelia Betancor, Gerard Llobet, Contabilidad Financiera y Social de la Alta Velocidad en España. (Estudios sobre la economía española 2015-08). Fedea (Fundación de Estudios de Economía Aplicada), Madrid, 20 de Marzo 2015, 61 p. [formato PDF, 2,03 MB]. "Este trabajo estudia la rentabilidad financiera y social de la alta velocidad ferroviaria en España. El análisis se realiza para los cuatro corredores en funcionamiento a finales de 2013. Ambos análisis son contrafactuales, es decir, toman como punto de referencia lo que habría sucedido en caso de no acometer estas inversiones. Asimismo ambos se realizan para un horizonte temporal de 50 años que nos lleva a utilizar como criterios de decisión el VAN financiero y social en términos de valor esperado y distribuciones de probabilidad. Asimismo para facilitar la interpretación de las cifras éstas se expresan en unidades monetarias del año 2013. La evaluación desde el punto de vista financiero se concentra en el concepto de beneficio empresarial, y por tanto estudia qué parte de los costes, incluyendo la inversión, se cubre con los ingresos de las empresas que gestionan los servicios y la infraestructura (RENFE y ADIF). Por otro lado el análisis de la rentabilidad social contrapone los beneficios derivados de las ganancias de tiempo, disposiciones a pagar de la demanda generada y costes evitados, con los costes de oportunidad de la inversión y la operación. Con la excepción del análisis financiero del corredor Madrid-Norte, los resultados muestran que se cubren los costes variables tanto en términos financieros como sociales. Sin embargo en ningún caso se cubre la inversión, lo que implica que, teniendo en cuenta los niveles de demanda, estas inversiones no son rentables ni para las empresas ni para la sociedad."

Bent Flyvbjerg (Oxford University), What You Should Know About Megaprojects and Why: An Overview, Project Management Journal, April/May 2014 (14 p.) [formato PDF, 630 kB]. "This paper takes stock of megaproject management, an emerging and hugely costly field of study. First, it answers the question of how large megaprojects are by measuring them in the units mega, giga, and tera, concluding we are presently entering a new "tera era" of trillion-dollar projects. Second, total global megaproject spending is assessed, at USD 6-9 trillion annually, or 8 percent of total global GDP, which denotes the biggest investment boom in human history. Third, four "sublimes" – political, technological, economic, and aesthetic – are identified to explain the increased size and frequency of megaprojects. Fourth, the "iron law of megaprojects" is laid out and documented: Over budget, over time, over and over again. Moreover, the "break-fix model" of megaproject management is introduced as an explanation of the iron law. Fifth, Albert O. Hirschman's theory of the Hiding Hand is revisited and critiqued as unfounded and corrupting for megaproject thinking in both the academy and policy. Sixth, it is shown how megaprojects are systematically subject to "survival of the unfittest," explaining why the worst projects get built instead of the best. Finally, it is argued that the conventional way of managing megaprojects has reached a "tension point," where tradition is challenged and reform is emerging."

Stef Proost, Fay Dunkerley, Saskia Van der Loo, Nicole Adler, Johannes Bröcker, Artem Korzhenevych, Do the selected Trans European transport investments pass the cost benefit test? Transportation, January 2014, Volume 41, Issue 1, pp 107-132 (22 p.) [formato PDF, 390 kB]. "This paper assesses the economic justification for the selection of priority projects defined under the auspices of the Trans-European transport network. In analyzing the current list of 30 priority projects, we apply three different transport models to undertake a cost-benefit comparison. We find that many projects do not pass the cost-benefit test and only a few of the economically justifiable projects would need European subsidies to make them happen. Two remedies are proposed to minimize the inefficiencies in future project selection. The first remedy obliges each member state or group of states to perform a cost-benefit analysis (followed by a peer review) and to make the results public prior to ranking priority projects. The second remedy would require federal funding to be available only for projects with important spillovers to other countries, in order to avoid pork barrel behaviour."

Silvia Maffii, Riccardo Parolin, Marco Ponti, L’"errore strategico" nelle valutazioni italiane. Le maggiori distorsioni finalizzate a dimostrare la fattibilità economico-finanziaria di infrastrutture di trasporto non fattibili. Paper, convegno Sipotra "La valutazione economica delle infrastrutture di trasporto tra errori passati e prospettive future", Milano, 6 giugno 2014, 10 p. [formato PDF, 642 kB]. "Le note che seguono si riferiscono ad alcuni fatti molto concreti e dimostrabili: il primo e più evidente è la sistematica assenza di valutazioni negative nelle analisi rese note al pubblico; il secondo è la scarsità di tali analisi; il terzo è l’assoluta mancanza di “terzietà”, caratteristica indispensabile per dare un minimo di credibilità alle analisi stesse. Queste sono sempre eseguite da portatori di interessi favorevoli della fattibilità dell’opera analizzata. Il quarto è l’assoluta assenza di analisi comparative, e tale assenza comporta che, anche se tutte le analisi avessero davvero dato risultati positivi, sia impossibile stabilire una qualche priorità, cioè escluderne alcune come “meno urgenti”. Tutto e sempre deve risultare fattibile, e possibilmente dar luogo all’apertura dei cantieri. Vi sono ovviamente anche molte considerazioni soltanto indiziarie, per la difficoltà o l’impossibilità di reperire dati e aprire archivi assolutamente riservati, pur trattandosi di risorse e progetti di interesse pubblico. Questi problemi sono inoltre resi ancora più difficili dal fatto che tra oggi e alcune vicende sono trascorsi parecchi anni. Il quadro complessivo che ne emerge tuttavia non consente maggiori dubbi sulla solidità dell’assunto."

Matthias Gather, Philipp Kosok, Analyse der regionalwirtschaftlichen Effekte des Fernstraßenbaus anhand ausgewählter Autobahnprojekte. (Berichte des Instituts Verkehr und Raum, Band 13, 2013). Institut Verkehr und Raum der Fachhochschule Erfurt, Erfurt, März 2013, 82 p. [formato PDF, 5,42 MB]. "Anhand von nach 1990 neu gebauten Autobahnen in Niedersachsen (A28/31 im Emsland), der Ostseeautobahn A20, der Thüringer Waldautobahn A71 sowie der A38 in Nordthüringen untersuchten die Wissenschaftler, ob in diesen Regionen entlang der Autobahnen stärkere Wachstumsimpulse hinsichtlich Bevölkerungsentwicklung, Bruttoinlandsprodukt oder Arbeitslosigkeit als in Räumen ohne Autobahnanschluss zu verzeichnen sind. Die durchgeführten regionalstatistischen Analysen in allen untersuchten Regionen ergaben, dass kein Zusammenhang zwischen Autobahnnähe und positiver wirtschaftlicher Entwicklung nachgewiesen werden kann. Zudem lagen bei fast allen Autobahnabschnitten die Baukosten deutlich über den damaligen Erwartungen, wogegen die Verkehrsnachfrage ausnahmslos geringer als prognostiziert ausfiel. Insgesamt kommen die Bearbeiter daher zu dem Ergebnis, dass die großen Erwartungen der neu errichteten Verkehrsinfrastrukturen nicht erfüllt werden konnten und der Neubau von Autobahnen grundsätzlich kein zielgerichtetes und wirkungsvolles Instrument zur Wirtschaftsförderung in peripheren Regionen darstellt."

Massimo Florio and Silvia Vignetti, The use of ex post Cost-Benefit Analysis to assess the long-term effects of Major Infrastructure Projects. (Working Paper N. 02/2013). Centre for Industrial Studies (CSIL), Milano, May 2013, 18 p. [formato PDF, 144 kB]. "This paper draws and expands from a recent ex-post evaluation carried out for the European Commission aimed at assessing the long term effects produced by a sample of ten major infrastructures in the Transport and Environment sectors and interpreting the key determinants of the observed performance. This evaluation study offered a unique opportunity to draw conclusions on the value of performing ex-post evaluations and to test an innovative evaluation design combining cost-benefit analysis (CBA) with qualitative assessment and adopting a long-run perspective (30 years), which extends into both the past and the future, and requires a mix of retrospective and prospective analysis. This paper presents the potential of ex-post CBA to assess long term impacts of major infrastructure projects and discusses some methodological and institutional implications related to its use".

Mattias Lundberg, Anchalee Jenpanitsub, Roger Pyddoke, Cost overruns in Swedish transport projects. (CTS Working Paper 2011:11). Centre for Transport Studies, Stockholm, 2011, 16 p. [formato PDF, 274 kB]. "Cost overrun of transport projects is one of the most important problems in transport planning. It also makes the result of the cost-benefit analyses uncertain, thus decreasing their usefulness for decision making. In recent years more emphasis has been put on improving cost calculations and reducing cost overruns, in Sweden and internationally. Still cost overruns have not decreased. We find that the average cost overrun in Swedish road projects is similar to other countries, while it is lower than in other countries for rail. Small projects (<100 million SEK) have much higher cost overruns than large projects and constitute a large share of total overruns. A project type with large overruns, both in absolute and relative terms, is new rail tracks on existing lines. To improve cost estimates in Sweden, the Successive Calculation method has recently been applied. We find that the variance is significantly lower in these than in actual outcomes, and that the difference is surprisingly small between projects in different planning stages. Another method, Reference Class Forecasting, is demonstrated in two case studies. It results in higher required uplifts. An interesting way forward would be to develop risk-based estimating, based on principal component analysis. To do that, a database needs to be collected, which in turn demands better follow-up procedures."

Ginés De Rus (University of Las Palmas de G.C., University Carlos III de Madrid), Economic evaluation of the High Speed Rail. Revised (May, 2012), 93 p. [formato PDF, 1,10 MB]. This report is undertaken for The Expert Group on Environmental Studies (Ministry of Finance, Sweden). "Investment in high speed rail (HSR) infrastructure produces social benefits and costs. The potential benefits are basically time savings, higher reliability, comfort, safety and the release of capacity in the conventional rail network, roads and airport infrastructure. The costs are high, and sunk in a significant proportion; therefore, the social profitability of the project requires that HSR users’ and other beneficiaries’ willingness to pay is high enough to compensate the sunk and variable costs of maintaining and operating the line plus any other external cost during construction and project life. In Sweden there are now plans to build a high speed rail between the country´s two largest cities, Stockholm and Gothenburg. The distance between the cities is around 500 km. This is a standard medium-length line where the HSR develops its full potential. In this paper we conduct a cost-benefit analysis of the HSR lines for Madrid-Barcelona, Madrid-Seville and Stockholm-Gothenburg. The first one has been running for a couple of years and the second one since 1992, so we can evaluate their performance and increase our understanding of the potential social profitability of similar lines, like the Stockholm-Gothenburg where the investment decision has not been taken so far."

Håvard Bergsdal, Johan Pettersen, Christian Solli, Christine Hung, Carine Grossrieder and Johanne Hammervold (MiSA – Miljøsystemanalyse), Environmental analysis : Climate. Norwegian High Speed Railway Project, Phase 3. Final report. Version 2 (03.02.2012) including all alignments. Miljøsystemanalyse AS, Sandvika/Trondheim, February 2012, 116 p. [formato PDF, 3,92 MB]. "The Norwegian Ministry for Transport and Communications has mandated a national assessment for high-speed rail (HSR) in Norway. This study presents the greenhouse gas (GHG) projections for the Norwegian HSR assessment. A total of 12 HSR alignments are assessed. They are all quite different in terms of landscape, distances and type of market. High-speed rail is proposed as a GHG-reducing measure, as it may be operated on clean electric energy with low energy use per seat-km. However, the operation of HSR requires an initial investment in the construction of a HSR line. The benefit from HSR concepts therefore is a function of market shift by introduction of HSR and emission intensity in the competing transport alternatives, as well as the utilization rate of the built HSR line. This study aims to assess the net benefit for GHG emissions in kg CO2e. Results present the effect on GHG emissions over a 60 year assessment period, and time required to pay back the initial GHG investment in HSR infrastructure."

Huib van Essen, Ewout Dönszelmann, Linda Brinke, Arno Schroten, Eelco den Boer, Climate Rating of Transport Infrastructure Projects. Exploration of a methodology for including climate impacts in project appraisal. CE Delft, Delft, October 2011, 56 p. [formato PDF, 641 kB]. "In its recent White Paper on Transport the Commission announced ambitious plans for building a competitive transport system. At the same time, the Commission set specific objectives for greenhouse gas reduction in transport in its Roadmap for decarbonisation, which were further elaborated in the White Paper. The climate policy set out in these papers aims at a dramatic reduction of Europe's dependence on imported oil and a cut in carbon emissions in transport by 60% by 2050, compared to 1990 levels. Infrastructure policy and climate policy interfere. Developing or upgrading transport infrastructure can have significant impacts on the decarbonisation of transport. While some types of infrastructure carry the risk to get locked-in to carbon intensive technology or transport modes, other projects may actually contribute to greenhouse gas reduction. Until now, the impacts on greenhouse gas emissions are not well integrated in transport infrastructure project appraisal. This is not only true at a European level but also at most national and local levels. Climate rating could solve this by explicitly taking account of the effect on greenhouse gases emissions in the infrastructure project appraisal and funding decisions. The European Commission announced that it aims at making climate rating be a part of the decision process for investments (EC, 2011). However, the Commission has not yet decided on a methodology for climate rating. In order to achieve this interlinking of policy objectives and to feed the Commission with further developing this issue, the European Federation for Transport & Environment (T&E), together with partners asked CE Delft to develop a methodology for climate rating, which is presented in this report. Although the study primarily focuses on TEN-T, recommendations could also be applied to other EU funds which can, directly or indirectly, influence the decarbonisation of the European transport sector. The greenhouse gas impacts of new, extended or upgraded transport infrastructure consist of four main elements: 1. Changes in greenhouse gas emissions from traffic; 2. Changes in greenhouse gas emissions from infrastructure operation, maintenance and management (OMM); 3. Greenhouse gas emissions from infrastructure development and end-of-life processes; 4. Other impacts, such as indirect effects on other sectors. This is true for all different types of infrastructure, including the development of new or upgraded road, rail or waterway infrastructure, interconnection of different transport modes, intelligent transport systems or innovative energy projects (e.g. new carbon free operation). Traffic impacts are relevant for all types of projects. Sometime these are mainly the results form changes in transport volume or modal split, e.g. in the case of a port the upgrade of a railway line. In other cases, the changes in traffic emissions are mainly the result of changes in energy technology or vehicle efficiency, e.g. in the case of electrification projects. The greenhouse gas impacts from traffic can be calculated with the traffic volumes per mode and vehicle type and the relative emission factors per vehicle type. The traffic data can be retrieved from traffic modelling. They should be the same as the data used for the socio economic assessment of the project. The emission factors can be retrieved from national emission registration or datasets (e.g. TREMOVE). They should reflect real-life well-to-wheel emissions. The relative importance of emissions from developing, maintaining, managing or operating infrastructure depends strongly on the type of project. In some cases, such as the construction of high speed railway line, these impacts can vary significantly, while in other cases they can expected to be negligible, e.g. for traffic management systems. These emissions can be estimated using either emission factors per type of material and energy used (bottom-up approach) or by using typical values, e.g. per lane or track kilometre (top-down). For comparing different projects, the change in greenhouse gas emissions after project realisation compared to the reference scenario should be compared to a measure for the size or value of the project. The (EU or total) investment is the best candidate for this for the short to medium term. For the longer term, also the net contribution to economic welfare from the cost benefit analysis could be used, however, these are currently often not available. The value of the climate rating indicator could be used for deciding on the co-funding rate or for prioritisation of projects. The methodology has been applied to a few concrete examples. From this it can be concluded that climate rating is possible and can help to integrate climate and infrastructure objectives. A further development of the methodology is strongly recommended, both at the EU level (e.g. by the TEN-T Agency) as well as at national level, with support of relevant experts."

Paolo Beria, Raffaele Grimaldi (Politecnico di Milano), An Early Evaluation of Italian High Speed Projects (Una prima valutazione dell’Alta Velocità in Italia). TeMA Vol 4, No 3, settembre 2011, p. 15-28 (15 p.) [formato PDF, 794 kB]. "L’Italia ha affrontato, negli ultimi 15 anni, un eccezionale sforzo finanziario per costruire circa 1 000 km di linee ferroviarie ad alta velocità. Ulteriori estensioni sono attualmente in costruzione o sono state pianificate, in particolare sulle principali relazioni internazionali. Questa rete è comunemente considerata fondamentale nella visione europea di un sistema di trasporto continentale. Questo articolo analizza il passato ed il futuro di questa rete, laddove possibile da un punto di vista quantitativo. La prima parte dell’articolo ripercorre la storia del progetto Alta Velocità, soffermandosi in particolare sulle questioni relative alla regolazione degli investimenti ed alle vicende finanziarie nelle prime fasi ed alle questioni attuali relative alla regolazione dei servizi ferroviari. Nella seconda parte l’analisi dell’offerta, dei guadagni di tempo permessi, della domanda e dei costi permette di sviluppare una valutazione ex post – semplificata ma indipendente - dei progetti realizzati, sottolineandone i successi e le potenzialità ancora inespresse, ma anche le significative criticità. L’ultima parte dell’articolo analizza i piani di espansione futura, confrontando i costi, la domanda esistente e quella attesa. Tale analisi permette di derivare alcune indicazioni di politica dei trasporti e strategie di riduzione dei costi, al fine di controllare la spesa pubblica in un periodo di crisi, senza abbandonare l’idea di una rete ferroviaria moderna ed efficace." "Italy has undergone, in the last 15 years, an exceptional public financial effort to build approximately 1,000 km of high speed rail lines. Further extensions are under construction or planned, especially in the most important international relations. This network is widely considered as fundamental to comply the European vision of a continental-wide transport system. The paper analyses the past and the future of such network, where possible from a quantitative point of view. The first part of the article reviews the history of the Alta Velocità scheme, particularly focusing on the issues related to the economic regulation of the investments and the financial troubles at first and then on the present issues related to the regulation of rail services. The analysis of the supply, the time gains, the demand and the costs allows to build a simple but independent evaluation of the past projects from an ex-post perspective, pointing out the successes, but also important critical issues. The second part of the paper analyses the future expansion plans looking at the costs, the existing and expected demand and derives some policy indications and cost reduction strategies capable both to control public expenditure in a period of crisis and not to abandon the idea of a modern and effective rail network."

Andrea Debernardi, Raffaele Grimaldi, Paolo Beria, Cost benefit analysis to assess modular investment: the case of the New Turin-Lyon Railway. (MPRA Paper No. 30327). “Contemporary Issues in CBA in the Transport Sector”, Workshop on March 16, 2011, Centre for Transport Studies (KTH), Stockholm (Sweden), 16 p. [formato PDF, 956 kB]. "The assessment of infrastructure investments is often affected by inaccuracy in traffic forecasting, optimism bias and overvaluation of expected benefits. In general, even when such misrepresentation is not strategically introduced by proponents to push their projects, valuators and decision makers must cope with the existence of a risk of demand levels below expectations and consequent problem of overinvestment. In this sense, the concept of option value suggests that flexible or reversible projects may have a higher economic net present value compared with rigid schemes characterised by sunk costs. However, conventionally used cost benefit analysis (CBA) is very seldom used to manage such problem due to the complexity of the issue (for example when introducing a complete risk analysis). Moreover, such CBAs are still conceived as a static tool to decide ex-ante about an investment. In this paper we develop a theoretical framework and a practical application of CBA to formally manage such uncertainty and help the decision makers by postponing some decisions to the following running phase. The idea is to assess the project as split into smaller functional sections and bind the construction of a further section to the compliance of a pre-determined “switching rule”. In practical terms, we adapt a normal CBA procedure to manage also the time dimension of time of investments to reallocate risks already in the early design stage of transport infrastructures. The purpose of the paper is twofold. Firstly, we introduce a way to extend conventional CBA methodology to manage the phasing of projects. Secondly, we demonstrate both theoretically (with a simplified model) and practically (with a more complex case study) the positive effect of phasing under certain conditions (limitedness of sunk-costs due to phasing, predominance of capacity problems). By numerically developing the CBA of the Turin – Lyon high speed rail project, we show how to reduce the risk of overestimation of traffic and its positive effect in terms of NPV of the project: if forecasts are optimistic, only the most effective parts of the scheme will be built. If the traffic forecasts are correct, the new infrastructure will be built as a whole in steps and will generate the highest net benefits."

Chantal C. Cantarelli, Bent Flyvbjerg, Eric J.E. Molin and Bert van Wee, Cost Overruns in Large-scale Transportation Infrastructure Projects: Explanations and Their Theoretical Embeddedness. European Journal of Transport and Infrastructure Research EJTIR 10(1), March 2010, p. 5-18 (14 p.) [formato PDF, 163 kB]. "Managing large-scale transportation infrastructure projects is difficult due to frequent misinformation about the costs which results in large cost overruns that often threaten the overall project viability. This paper investigates the explanations for cost overruns that are given in the literature. Overall, four categories of explanations can be distinguished: technical, economic, psychological, and political. Political explanations have been seen to be the most dominant explanations for cost overruns. Agency theory is considered the most interesting for political explanations and an eclectic theory is also considered possible. Non-political explanations are diverse in character, therefore a range of different theories (including rational choice theory and prospect theory), depending on the kind of explanation is considered more appropriate than one all-embracing theory."

Daniel Albalate, Germà Bel (Universitat de Barcelona), Cuando la economía no importa: auge y esplendor de la alta velocidad en España. Revista de Economía Aplicada, n.55, vol. 19, 2011, p. 171-190 [formato PDF, 750 kB]. "The great protagonist of the Spanish transport policy, High Speed Rail (HSR), has reached its greatest splendour to become, in late 2010, the largest HSR network of EU and OECD countries. However, the investment policy decisions have been taken in a context devoid of an open and rigorous debate and where economic analysis, which has obtained clear and robust results, has played a marginal role. The marginality of the effect of economic analysis on the investment policy is due to its almost exclusive emphasis on the financial aspects and the reluctance to address multidisciplinary elements that, in practice, have been commonly used as persuasive arguments for government’s network design. This paper provides an analysis in terms of objectives and actual effects of high speed projects, taking into account the multiple dimensions in order to complement the economic analysis by favouring its impact in the public policy debate. Among these multiple dimensions, we review the issues concerning the design and structure of the network, the economic costs and social return on investments, as well as the environmental and mobility impacts."

Chris Nash (Univ. of Leeds), When to Invest in High-Speed Rail Links and Networks?. (Discussion Paper No 2009-16). OECD/ITF, December 2009, 24 p. [formato PDF, 556 kB]. "Most successful applications of high speed rail seem to arise when there is both a need for more rail capacity and a commercial need for higher speeds. It seems difficult to justify building a new line solely for purposes of increased speed unless traffic volumes are very large, but when a new line is to be built, the marginal cost of higher speed may be justified; conversely the benefits of higher speed may help to make the case for more capacity. It follows from the above that appraisal of HSR will need to include assessment of the released capacity benefits for freight, local and regional passenger services and the changes in service levels on the conventional lines. It also follows that the case for HSR is heavily dependent both on future economic growth and on the assumption that demand for long distance passenger and freight transport will continue to increase. If long run economic recession, or environmental constraints prevent this from occurring then far less new HSR will be justified than in a =business as usual‘ scenario. Already the current recession will have at least delayed the case for some new lines, although increased government spending to reflate the economy may have the opposite effect. High speed rail is more successful at competing with air than car, and there is evidence for the widely quoted 3 hour rail journey time threshold (although this evidence predates the increased security and congestion at airports which is believed to have increased this threshold). Where rail journey times can be brought close to or below 3 hours HSR can be expected to take a major share of origin-destination aviation markets. Of the measured indirect benefits of HSR investment, congestion is the most significant. Relief of road congestion is, however, unlikely to be a major part of the case for high speed rail except where chronic congestion is spread throughout the day along much of the route. Relief of airport capacity through transfer of domestic legs from air to rail is potentially more important where capacity is scarce and expansion is difficult, costly and has a serious environmental impact, as in the case of Heathrow. Environmental benefits are unlikely to be a significant part of the case for high speed rail when all relevant factors are considered, but nor are they a strong argument against it provided that high load factors can be achieved and the infrastructure itself can be accommodated without excessive environmental damage. A key factor here is the approach to cities, where the choice may be between use of conventional tracks at reduced speed or expensive tunnelling. The issue of wider economic benefits remains one of the hardest to tackle; such benefits could be significant, but vary significantly from case to case, so an in depth study of each case is required. The breakeven volume of passengers to justify a new high speed line is very variable, ranging from 3m to 17m in the first year of operation under possible assumptions examined, but typically even under favourable conditions at least 9m passengers per annum will be needed. Whilst it appears that all the French high speed lines comfortably exceeded this volume, it is clear that some proposals are being developed where traffic is very much less dense (the Madrid-Seville line, for instance, carried less than 3m passengers in its second year of operation and is still only at around the 5m level). The most important variable in determining the breakeven volume is the construction cost, which varies enormously according to circumstances. It is important to consider network effects. The benefits of a high speed line may be maximised by locating it where it may carry traffic to a wide number of destinations using existing tracks beyond the end of the high speed line, whilst extensions to an existing network lead to greater benefits than isolated new lines by attracting increased traffic to the network as a whole. Obviously this implies technical compatibility between HSR and existing rail as a prime requirement."

Ginés De Rus Mendoza, Chris Nash, ¿En qué circunstancias está justificado invertir en líneas de alta velocidad ferroviaria?. (Documentos de Trabajo, 4/2009). Fundación BBVA, Bilbao, 2009, 54 p. [formato PDF, 586 kB]. "This working paper reviews the key costs and benefits of high speed rail (HSR) investments. It also discusses, as case studies, several proposals of HSR lines in Britain and the existing Madrid-Seville corridor. It finally develops a model to investigate the demand conditions under which high speed rail is socially profitable. It concludes that only under exceptional circumstances (a combination of low construction costs plus high time savings, perhaps because the existing rail infrastructure and services on competing modes are very poor) could a new HSR line be justified with a level of patronage below six million passengers per annum on opening; with more typical construction costs and time savings a figure more like nine million passengers per annum is needed."

Ginés De Rus, Concepción Román (Universidad de Las Palmas), Análisis económico de la línea de alta velocidad Madrid-Barcelona. Revista de Economía Aplicada, n.42, vol. 14, 2006, p. 35-79 [formato PDF, 1,55 MB]. "La inversión en infraestructura de alta velocidad ferroviaria es de alto coste y de naturaleza irreversible; sus beneficios están sujetos a incertidumbre y la construcción de la red puede realizarse gradualmente. En estas circunstancias, la evaluación económica ex ante es especialmente valiosa porque los proyectos pueden retrasarse. La inversión pública en esta tecnología requiere estimar el coste inicial de construcción de la infraestructura y los flujos de beneficios y costes operativos esperados durante la vida del proyecto. En el flujo de beneficios netos debe incluirse, junto a la disposición a pagar de los usuarios, los ahorros derivados de la reducción de la congestión en el pasillo de tráfico afectado, así como los costes evitados gracias a la introducción de la nueva tecnología. Sobre la base de un modelo simplificado de evaluación económica para la línea Madrid-Barcelona, las estimaciones de las disposiciones a pagar de los individuos y de la estructura de costes, se han obtenido los niveles de demanda mínimos que se requieren para alcanzar un valor actual neto de la inversión positivo, bajo ciertos supuestos sobre la tasa de descuento, vida del proyecto, crecimiento anual de los beneficios netos, y generación de tráfico. La evaluación realizada se fundamenta en la estimación de modelos de demanda desagregados a partir de la información obtenida mediante encuestas en los corredores: Madrid-Zaragoza y Madrid-Barcelona. En el primer caso, con la alta velocidad en funcionamiento se ha estimado un modelo de elección modal basado en datos de preferencias reveladas de los usuarios de dicho corredor. En el segundo caso, el modelo es mixto preferencias declaradas/reveladas. Los datos de las preferencias declaradas se basan en un experimento de elección modal entre avión y tren de alta velocidad que incluye, además de los atributos de nivel de servicio típicos, variables latentes de confort y fiabilidad."

Stef Proost, Fay Dunkerley, Saskia Van der Loo, Nicole Adler, Johannes Broecker, Artem Korzhenevych, Do the selected Trans European transport investments pass the Cost Benefit test?. January 2010, 22 p. [formato PDF, 394 kB]. "This paper assesses the economic justification for the selection of priority projects defined under the auspices of the Trans-European transport network. In analyzing the current list of 30 priority projects, we apply three different transport models to undertake a cost-benefit comparison. We find that many projects do not pass the cost-benefit test and only a few of the economically justifiable projects would need European subsidies to make them happen. Two remedies are proposed to minimize the inefficiencies in future project selection. The first remedy obliges each member state or group of states to perform a cost-benefit analysis (followed by a peer review) and to make the results public prior to ranking priority projects. The second remedy would require federal funding to be available only for projects with important spillovers to other countries, in order to avoid pork barrel behaviour."

Francisco Javier Campos Méndez, Ginés De Rus Mendoza y Ignacio M. Barrón de Angoiti, El transporte ferroviario de alta velocidad: una visión económica. (Documentos de Trabajo, 3/2009). Fundación BBVA, Bilbao, Marzo 2009, 46 p. [formato PDF, 484 kB]. "Tras recopilar información sobre 166 proyectos de alta velocidad ferroviaria en todo el mundo, este documento de trabajo analiza algunas de las cuestiones empíricas más relevantes relacionadas con el desarrollo que ha tenido en los últimos años este nuevo modo de transporte. El estudio comienza discutiendo la definición económica de alta velocidad, identificando para ello los diferentes modelos de explotación ferroviaria que existen en la actualidad. A continuación, a partir de los parámetros más representativos de la misma, se realiza una estimación de los costes de la construcción de una línea de alta velocidad ferroviaria. El análisis se extiende posteriormente a los gastos de operación y mantenimiento, así como a los principales costes externos. Finalmente, se estudia la demanda y sus proyecciones futuras, particularmente en el contexto europeo y en el horizonte de 2020."

Javier Campos, La financiación de la alta velocidad ferroviaria en España desde la perspectiva del análisis económico. III Jornadas Internacionales sobre Ingeniería para Alta Velocidad, Córdoba, 24 de Junio de 2009, 15 slides [formato PDF, 888 kB].

Javier Campos, La financiación de la alta velocidad ferroviaria en España desde la perspectiva del análisis económico. "Paradojas de la Alta Velocidad", Córdoba, Junio de 2009, 22 p. [formato PDF, 530 kB]. "Este documento analiza, desde la perspectiva del análisis económico, la financiación de las inversiones en alta velocidad ferroviaria en España. El trabajo comienza evaluando el alcance y objetivo de dichas inversiones en el vigente Plan Estratégico de Infraestructuras de Transporte (PEIT) del Ministerio de Fomento y estudia las fuentes de financiación previstas en dicho plan para alcanzar dichos objetivos. Frente a la situación actual, en la que la realización de las distintas inversiones parece estar condicionada a la disponibilidad de financiación presupuestaria y/o ayudas comunitarias, este trabajo argumenta que un criterio fundamental para la evaluación de la aprobación y periodificación de dichas inversiones también debería ser la demanda esperada de cada proyecto, proponiéndose finalmente algunos mecanismos simples para implementar tal evaluación."

Mark J. Koetse, Jan Rouwendal, Transport and Welfare Consequences of Infrastructure Investment: A Case Study for the Betuweroute. (Serie Research Memoranda, FEWEB RM 2008-12). Amsterdam, Faculty of Economics and Business Administration (FEWEB), Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, 2008, 24 p. [formato PDF, 201 kB]. "This paper presents a study on appraisal of the Betuweroute, a 160 kilometre dedicated freight railway line connecting the port of Rotterdam with the German Ruhr area. The Betuweroute is an interesting example of a major investment in railroads for several reasons. Political decision making on the Betuwe project and calculations on its profitability were based on questionable assumptions, the two most important ones being that freight transport by trucks would become substantially more expensive, and that inland waterways would not be used more intensively for freight transport. Even though construction is completed, it is still unclear to what extent the route is going to be used in the future. Even though this may suggest that the Betuweroute is financially unviable, it should be noted that it provides a potentially important link in the transport network that links the major harbours of Hamburg, Rotterdam and Antwerp with the German hinterland. If the line could – in the near or more remote future – attract a large share of transit freight, as was expected in official project appraisals, it will be of considerable importance for the competitive position of the port of Rotterdam relative to Hamburg and Antwerp. In the paper we provide a brief review of the history of the project and its place in the freight transport network of north-western Europe. Then we proceed to a formal analysis of the impact of pricing of the various modes on the appraisal of the Betuweroute, based on the MOLINO model. The network we use includes the ports of Rotterdam, Antwerp and Hamburg and distinguishes between transport by road, railway and inland waterways. Since the Betuweroute connects Rotterdam to the Ruhr area, we use transport to and from this area as the driving force of the transport flows on this network. We present model simulations for scenario’s with and without the Betuweroute and with and without marginal social costs pricing."

Paolo Beria, Raffaele Grimaldi, Marco Ponti (Politecnico di Milano), Il ruolo delle analisi economico-finanziarie nelle scelte ferroviarie. Presentazione al convegno "Quali ferrovie a Nord Est. Le proposte del WWF", Trieste, 24.10.2008, 29 slides [formato PDF, 731 kB].

J. Paul Elhorst and Jan Oosterhaven (Univ. of Groningen), Integral cost-benefit analysis of Maglev projects under market imperfections. Journal of Transport and Land Use, 1 (2008) 65–87 [formato PDF, 700 kB]. "This article evaluates a new mode of high speed ground transportation, the magnetic levitation rail system (Maglev). The outcomes of this evaluation provide policy information on the interregional redistribution of employment and population and the national welfare improvement of two Dutch urban-conglomeration and two Dutch core-periphery projects. This article also compares the results of an integral cost- benefit analysis with those of a conventional cost-benefit analysis and concludes that the additional economic benefits due to market imperfections vary from –1% to +38% of the direct transport benefits, depending on the type of regions connected and the general condition of the economy." Questo studio accurato conclude che i costi d'investimento e di gestione di possibili linee ferroviarie a levitazione magnetica nei Paesi Bassi non verrebbero coperti dalle entrate nè verrebbero compensati dalla riduzione di costi esterni.

Institut Montaigne, Infrastructures de transport: lesquelles bâtir, comment les choisir ?. Institut Montaigne, Paris, Juillet 2008, 84 p. [formato PDF, 620 kB]. "Ce rapport exprime une triple conviction, qui ouvre autant de chantiers à poursuivre. En premier lieu, dans notre société contemporaine, les choix publics ne peuvent ignorer l’avis des groupes de citoyens. Il n’est plus possible aujourd’hui d’imposer des décisions reposant sur des enjeux non clairement exposés, discutés et validés. Il est donc indispensable que les processus favorisent la concertation entre parties prenantes. La réalité est que la vision historique française de l’intérêt général – qui place la décision de l’État au-dessus des intérêts particuliers – a vécu. Encore faut-il en tirer tous les enseignements. Ainsi, en matière d’évaluation économique, il est douteux qu’on puisse demain se contenter d’une valeur agrégée. Il faudrait reconnaître dans le calcul les gagnants et les perdants. Les réflexions sur la récupération de la rente foncière, d’une part, et sur la compensation des citoyens soumis à des nuisances, d’autre part, participent de cette approche. En second lieu, la dimension économique de l’évaluation doit être préservée car elle est un indicateur de l’utilité collective. Le calcul économique doit donc être légitimé. Mais sans doute doit-il aussi évoluer profondément pour mieux rendre compte des préférences collectives. Ses valeurs de référence doivent rendre compte de l’objectif du « facteur 4 » (réduction de 75 % des émissions de gaz à effet de serre à l’horizon 2050). Mais elles doivent aussi être élargies à d’autres critères (accessibilité, maintien de la biodiversité, qualité du paysage…), qui seront sans doute difficiles à valoriser. Enfin, certains avancent déjà l’idée d’une recherche d’efficience (faire mieux sur un choix) au-delà de l’efficacité (faire mieux par rapport à un autre choix). En troisième lieu, le développement durable doit imprégner la doctrine des infrastructures. Une évidence est que celui-là et celles-ci se situent dans la même unité de temps. Penser les infrastructures oblige donc à un effort de prospective, qui n’est pas nécessairement – et sans doute pas du tout – un prolongement du présent. Ceci peut conduire à des approches nouvelles : geler le foncier pour préserver l’avenir n’oblige pas à lancer un chantier sans attendre. Une crainte est que le souci du respect de l’environnement ne favorise une réglementation absconse et exponentielle : bien utilisé, le principe de précaution doit mettre en balance les intérêts économiques, sociaux et environnementaux. Un fait est l’importance du signal prix dans une politique de développement durable. L’utilisateur doit savoir combien coûte le service qu’il utilise. En même temps, il y a des solutions pour les différents types d’utilisateur par une meilleure valorisation des services attachés à une infrastructure : modulation tarifaire, diversification des services. En résumé, au temps des listes de projets doit succéder une programmation politique précisant les enjeux, les objectifs et les méthodes."

Ginés de Rus Mendoza, Ofelia Betancor Cruz, Javier Campos Méndez (Universidad de Las Palmas de Gran Canaria), Manual de evaluación económica de proyectos de transporte. Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo, Washington DC, 2006, 188 p. [formato PDF, 2,40 MB].

Mark Koetse, Frank Bruinsma, Piet Rietveld (Free University Amsterdam), Costs of Road Infrastructure for Passenger and Freight Transport in The Netherlands. ERSA Conference 2003, 17 p. [formato PDF, 186 kB]. "In this paper the costs of construction, maintenance, governance and land use of road infrastructure in The Netherlands are allocated to several transport modes in passenger and freight transport. Opposed to earlier research, a considerable number of weight categories are distinguished regarding freight transport. The results show that costs per kilometre allocated to the heavier truck categories are considerably higher than those allocated to the lighter truck categories. The reason behind this is that fairly large parts of building costs and maintenance costs are allocated to the different transport modes on the basis of 4th power axle loads. Furthermore, large relative differences in average truck loading between the different weight categories have a significant influence on the results. Concluding we can state that when the distinction between weight categories made in this study is ignored, then a large part of the costs caused by heavy truck categories is allocated to lighter trucks and passenger transport modes."

Ginés de Rus and Chris Nash, In what circumstances is investment in High Speed Rail worthwhile?. (ITS Working Paper 590). Institute of Transport Studies, University of Leeds, February 2007, 34 p. [formato PDF, 711 kB]. "By High Speed Rail (HSR) we normally mean rail technologies capable of speeds of the order of 300km ph on new dedicated track. Such systems offer journey times that are more competitive with other modes, and particularly air, than traditional train services, and very high capacity. But their capital cost is also high. The proposals of the European Commission for the Trans European Transport Network (TEN-T) envisage expenditure of 600b euros, of which 250b euros is for priority projects, and a large part of this expenditure is for high speed rail. Thus it is extremely important to have a robust appraisal methodology for these huge investments. It is not clear that this has happened in the case of the Trans European Networks. Individual projects are suggested by, and appraised by, member state governments, even though they are applying to the European Commission for assistance with funding. Research for the European Commission has appraised the TEN-T network as a whole, but has not appraised the individual elements of the programme to ensure that they are all worthwhile (TML, 2005). The aim of this paper is to consider the methodology for the appraisal of high speed rail proposals, and to produce some indication of the circumstances in which such proposals might be worthwhile. In the next section we present an overview of the principal costs and benefits which need to be taken into account in an HSR appraisal. Then we illustrate the process for two particular contrasting examples – the study of HSR proposals in Great Britain, and an ex post evaluation of the Madrid-Seville line in Spain. In section four of the paper we formulate a model to incorporate the principal parameters influencing the outcome of an appraisal and in section five we use this model to draw conclusions on the circumstances in which high speed rail may be justified."

ECORYS Transport, CE Delft, Infrastructure expenditures and costs. Practical guidelines to calculate total infrastructure costs for five modes of transport. Final report. ECORYS Transport, Rotterdam, November 2005, 141 p. [formato PDF, 738 KB]. "DG TREN has commissioned ECORYS Transport and CE Delft to study the expenditures and costs of infrastructure, to propose an adequate classification of expenditures, and to propose a method for translating data on expenditures into data on costs. The objectives of the present study are threefold: To set out a classification of infrastructure expenditures, in order to increase knowledge of expenditures related to transport infrastructures. This classification should support a better understanding of fixed and variable infrastructure costs; To detail the various components of such expenditures for five modes of transportation, which would enable the monitoring of infrastructure expenditures and costs; To set up a methodology to move from annual series of expenditures to costs, including fixed and variable elements."

Werner Rothengatter (Universität Karlsruhe (TH), Risiken grosser Infrastrukturprojekte, relazione al convegno „Stadt und Verkehr – Innovationen und Visionen", 8. und 9. November 2007, Zürich, 45 slides [formato PDF, 0,97 MB]. (Il prof. Rothengatter esamina le previsioni di grandi progetti infrastrutturali e la differenza tra costi previsti e costi effettivi).

Operations Evaluation, Evaluation of cross-borders TEN projects. Synthesis report. European Investment Bank, December 2006, 46 p. [formato PDF, 898 KB]. "This ex-post evaluation covers EIB financing of selected cross-border (CB) trans-European Network (TEN) projects during the period 1995-2004."

Rete Ferroviaria Italiana, Rete AV/AC : analisi dei costi. Marzo 2007, 39 slides [formato PowerPoint, 2,83 MB]. (Analisi presentata il 27.03.2007 in audizione al Senato e scaricabile dal sito della senatrice Anna Donati). Analisi dei costi delle linee di alta velocità/ alta capacità realizzate e in costruzione in Italia, confrontati con i costi delle linee costruite in Francia e Spagna.

Paolo Beria, Transport megaprojects in Italy. Evaluation of large infrastructural projects economic feasibility in Italy: a comparative analysis. Politecnico di Milano, Laboratorio di Politica dei Trasporti, 2006, 18 p. [formato PDF, 280 KB]. "The paper derives from an on-going research project (started in year 2005) aimed to analyse the environmental impact assessments and the feasibility studies for some chosen infrastructural transport projects all over the Italian territory."

Paolo Beria, Marco Brambilla, Stefano Erba, The italian expenditure in transport infrastructure: a survey. Politecnico di Milano, 2004, 41 p. [formato PDF, 394 KB]. (Secondo lo studio, molti progetti di infrastrutture, in particolare per l'alta velocità ferroviaria e per il trasporto su lunghe distanze, non sono giustificati dal punto di vista economico e finanziario. Gli autori propongono invece una scala di priorità per gli investimenti, basata su analisi quantitative trasparenti e indipendenti). "After having analysed the official data and evidences of Italian rail and road systems, one can trace some conclusions and policy recommendations. Traffic data show a strong predominance of road towards rail in terms of traffic units (passengerkm and tonneskm) and short distance travels towards long distance ones. Long distance and international traffic is a minor part of total Italian traffic. Traffic intensity gets lower from North to South, with the exclusion of urban areas. To analyze the investments planned in the Italian context it was followed two different approaches. The first and taxonomical approach appear that the forecast investments in the Italian transport planning are focused on long distance corridors without any distinction for more congested areas. Rail investments are very similar in terms of monetary value to road ones, although the radical disparity between traffic volumes (see Table 40) and it is very hard to justify these projects, on the basis of a new modal switch with the available data that, in the last thirty years, show an average short distance for trips both for freight and passengers by road and rail."

Paolo Beria, Il ruolo e gli strumenti della valutazione. Analisi Costi Benefici e Analisi Multicriteria per la valutazione di progetti e politiche. Politecnico di Milano, Laboratorio di Politica dei Trasporti, ottobre 2005, 21 p. [formato PDF, 414 KB]. (documento didattico)

Ginés de Rus, Gustavo Nombela (University of Las Palmas), Is Investment in High Speed Rail Socially Profitable?. April 2005, 21 p. [formato PDF, 346 kB].

Ginés de Rus, Gustavo Nombela (University of Las Palmas), Is Investment in High Speed Rail Socially Profitable? Paper prepared for the V Milan European Economy Workshop, University of Milan, May 26-27, 2006, 21 p. [formato PDF, 346 kB]. Dalle conclusioni dello studio: "From actual construction, rolling stock, maintenance and operating costs of European HSR lines, average values of time, a reasonable range of potential travel time savings, and a 5% discount rate, we have found that HSR investment is difficult to justify when the expected first year demand is below 8-10 million passengers for a line of 500 Km, an optimal length for HSR to compete with road and air transport (assuming that the volume of demand is high enough to get a low average fixed cost, or alternatively HSR fares are subsidized)."

Marco Brambilla, Stefano Erba, Marco Ponti (Politecnico di Milano), Analisi economiche dei progetti della Legge Obiettivo, intervento alla VI riunione scientifica della SIET, Palermo, 13-14 Novembre 2003 [formato PDF, 295 Kb] ; presentazione [formato PDF, 486 Kb].

Bent Flyvbjerg, Mette Skamris Holm, Soren Buhl, Sottostima dei costi dei progetti di opere pubbliche: errore casuale o intenzionale? Archivio di studi urbani e regionali, 2005, p. 87-114 [formato PDF, 307 kB]. Lo studio "cerca di dare delle risposte statisticamente valide alle seguenti domande: quanto è frequente e significativa la differenza tra costi reali e costi stimati nei progetti di infrastrutture di trasporto?"

Michael Mann, Step change transport improvements: an assessment of the potential for 'step change' transport improvements to generate wider economic benefits. 2006, 38 p. [formato PDF, 308 kB]. Allegata allo studio di Sir Eddington per il governo britannico (vedi POLITICA DEI TRASPORTI), questa ricerca analizza vantaggi e svantaggi di una linea ferroviaria ad alta velocità nel contesto del Regno Unito. La conclusione è che i vantaggi economici sarebbero limitati e, soprattutto, bisognerebbe prima esaminare il possibile impiego dei grandi investimenti necessari in tutta una serie di opzioni alternative, tra cui il miglioramento delle infrastrutture e dei servizi esistenti.

"Conclusions on the strategic economic case for High Speed Rail: 41. Transformational economic benefits are unlikely to arise from a north-south high speed line because:

• UK cities are already well connected: it is hard to identify any promising examples of routes not served by air where day return trips are not already feasible using existing rail services.
• Agglomeration effects typically extend over 45 –60 min door to door travel time – even the fastest of HSLs to the North of England and Scotland are unlikely to provide such benefits.